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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

LIMITED LEVERAGE: FEDERAL REMEDIES AND POLICING
REFORM

RACHEL HARMON*
INTRODUCTION
Remedies for police misconduct have multiple purposes, including
punishing perpetrators, making victims whole, and forcing departments to
comply with constitutional rules. For those interested in reducing police
misconduct, the primary measure of federal legal remedies for police
misconduct is whether they deter future bad acts. Other speakers at Saint Louis
University Public Law Review’s Fall 2012 Symposium described good news
about federal remedies and future police misconduct despite Supreme Court
restrictions on the application of the exclusionary rule. For example, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 suits against municipalities for officer misconduct are imposing
significant costs on cities that permit officers to violate suspects’ rights; federal
criminal prosecutions against police officers have reached record highs this
year; and the Obama Administration has reinvigorated the use of 42 U.S.C. §
14141 to secure institutional reform in departments with a pattern and practice
of violating constitutional rights. These uses of federal remedies likely will
deter some officers from committing misconduct and encourage some
departments to prevent it. Unfortunately, this good news is overshadowed by
the persistent realities of federal remedies for misconduct.
Here is the bad news: with respect to deterring police misconduct, federal
remedies are almost as good as they are ever going to get. The remedies
probably reduce police misconduct some now, and they can be tailored to
induce somewhat more reform. However, legal, structural, and practical limits
on the capacity of existing federal remedies to deter misconduct ensure that
even with improvements they can be only marginally more effective.
Federal remedies for police misconduct, and most other remedies for
misconduct, promote change by making misconduct costly for police
departments and municipalities. Improving federal remedies would encourage
some additional departments to seek the positive expected return on reform
measures likely to reduce misconduct. But existing federal remedies all focus
* Sullivan & Cromwell Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law. I am grateful to
Robert Newman and Sarah Stewart for their helpful comments and to Adam Fleisher for his
excellent research assistance.
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on either increasing the cost of misconduct or reducing its benefits. The
problem is that even if existing federal remedies are altered to maximize
deterrence, they cannot be employed to impose a substantially greater price for
misconduct because, by their nature, the costs imposed by existing remedies
are relatively fixed. As a result, federal remedies for misconduct will never
prevent bad policing much more than they do now.
While existing federal remedies are constrained in their capacity to deter
much more than they do, there are alternative means of inspiring reform.
Strengthened state and local remedies, and new federal remedies, could
supplement existing federal remedies and incentivize additional reform—at
least to some degree. However, because these remedies suffer from some of
the same structural limits as existing federal remedies, and because expanding
them is politically unlikely, it may be time for those interested in deterring
misconduct further to consider a different approach. Instead, federal actors
may foster reform by lowering the costs of adopting policies that prevent
misconduct and by shoring up rewards for police chiefs and departments that
pursue reform. Some Justice Department programs already likely modify the
expected costs of reform, but the Department of Justice’s undertakings appear
both piecemeal and limited. Although discouraging police misconduct by
reducing the costs of reform and increasing its benefits poses some risks, the
limits of existing federal remedies suggest these risks may be well worth
taking.
I. THE CALCULUS OF POLICE REFORM
While individual police officers commit misconduct, preventing police
misconduct often requires institutional change, and institutional change
requires investment and commitment from departmental leadership. Federal
remedies both increase the expected costs of engaging in misconduct for police
officers, and perhaps more importantly, increase the expected costs of
permitting misconduct for police departments. As a result, federal remedies
have long been viewed as important to deter misconduct by individual officers
and to incentivize departmental reforms necessary to reduce unconstitutional
conduct.1
Police officers violate constitutional rights because they receive a benefit
or avoid a cost by doing so. An officer might use too much force to preempt a
suspect’s injurious resistance, to satisfy a taste for revenge, because he has a
mistaken understanding of the law governing force, or because it is quicker to

1. See, e.g., Wayne R. LaFave & Frank J. Remington, Controlling the Police: The Judge’s
Role in Making and Reviewing Law Enforcement Decisions, 63 MICH. L. REV. 987, 987 (1964)
(describing significance of exclusionary rule in deterring police misconduct); Caleb Foote, Tort
Remedies for Police Violations of Individual Rights, 39 MINN. L. REV. 493, 793 (1955)
(discussing advantages of federal civil remedies over state remedies to deter police misconduct).
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gain compliance by force than to persuade a suspect to cooperate.2 A rational
officer will learn and comply with the law governing force when the expected
costs of doing so are less than the net expected cost of misconduct. Legal
remedies are likely to reduce police misconduct when they raise the costs of
misconduct relative to restraint.
Scholars and others interested in reducing police misconduct emphasize
the significance of institutional change rather than simply focusing on
individual restraint, because police departments strongly shape individual
officer capacity and motivation to comply with constitutional norms.3 With
respect to capacity, police departments determine much of the preparation and
guidance officers receive beyond the minimum amounts dictated by state law.4
Some departments have their own police academies or provide supplemental
training for officers after basic training, including supervision by field training
officers.5 Many departments provide annual in-service training beyond state
mandates.6 All departments provide direct supervision of officers by sergeants
and other departmental leadership.7 This training and supervision—along with
formal departmental policies—gives officers the knowledge and skills
necessary to comply with constitutional requirements. If officers know the law,
learn to evaluate the situations they face, and are well-trained in the
communication, physical, and practical skills necessary to address those
situations, the costs of lawful policing for officers is lowered.
With respect to motivation, departments determine many of the
professional and financial incentives of the police officer’s work. If a

2. See Rachel A. Harmon, When is Police Violence Justified?, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1119,
1163 (2008).
3. See, e.g., Barbara Armacost, Organizational Culture and Police Misconduct, 72 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 453, 456, 493–94 (2004); CAMBRIDGE REVIEW COMM., MISSED OPPORTUNITIES,
SHARED RESPONSIBILITIES: FINAL REPORT OF THE CAMBRIDGE REVIEW COMMITTEE 7–9 (2010)
(advocating departmental changes to reduce confrontations between citizens and police officers
like the 2009 arrest of Henry Louis Gates, Jr. by an officer of the Cambridge, Massachusetts
Police Department).
4. See Rachel A. Harmon, The Problem of Policing, 110 MICH. L. REV. 761, 806 (2012)
(citing statistics from MATTHEW J. HICKMAN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT TRAINING ACADEMIES, 2002, at 10 (2005),
available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/slleta02.pdf.
5. See BRIAN A. REAVES, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LOCAL
POLICE DEPARTMENTS, 2007, at 12 (2010), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/
lpd07.pdf.
6. See HICKMAN, supra note 4, at iv.
7. Very small departments may provide less direct supervision of officers, but even in small
departments there is a chief of police who monitors the work of other officers, sometimes as a
matter of state law. See e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2–1701 (mandating that locally-organized
police forces have a chief of police who serves as the chief law enforcement officer of the
locality).
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department rewards arrests with promotions, officers will be motivated to
make more arrests, even those with a weak legal justification.8 If a department
disciplines illegal searches, officers will have good reason to engage in fewer
of them. Less formally, departmental leadership may foster respect for officers
engaged in aggressive policing even as official policies discourage
unconstitutional actions:9 if sergeants treat officers who disdain formal rules as
successful, other officers learn to value those qualities and young officers learn
to emulate them.10
Institutional police practices are in turn the product of departmental
leadership and the local political process. Mayors, city managers, and council
members hire and fire police chiefs, determine departmental budgets, and
oversee police activities—and therefore influence departmental policies.11 A
mayor might pressure a chief to police more assertively when voters complain
about crime, or threaten to impose external citizen review of police
disciplinary determinations in light of community concerns about abuse.
Moreover, peer groups, communities, and officer associations impose less
tangible costs and benefits on police leadership and officers for both
misconduct and reform.
While the factors that shape departmental policies and practices are
complex, deterrence theory suggests that a police department will adopt
remedial measures when doing so is a cost-effective means of lowering the net
costs of police misconduct or increasing the net benefits of protecting civil
rights.12 Legal remedies imposed for misconduct are one significant way of
making reform cost-effective for departments. Among those legal remedies are
four significant federal remedial mechanisms that can raise the expected costs
of misconduct for departments, and therefore incentivize reform and deter civil
rights violations: the federal exclusionary rule, which prohibits the use of
unconstitutionally obtained evidence in criminal trials; federal criminal
prosecutions for willful constitutional civil rights violations; private federal
civil suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for constitutional violations; and civil suits
by the U.S. Department of Justice under 42 U.S.C. § 14141 for equitable relief
against police departments to remedy patterns and practices of constitutional
violations.

8. See Armacost, supra note 3, at 495, 498–99.
9. See id. at 498–499, 518–520.
10. See id. at 516, 519.
11. Rachel A. Harmon, Promoting Civil Rights Through Proactive Policing Reform, 62
STAN. L. REV. 1, 46 (2009).
12. Id. at 22–23.
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By many accounts, these remedies increase the relative expected costs of
unconstitutional police conduct, at least to some degree.13 Despite doctrinal
changes that limit the exclusionary rule, it continues to affect individual cases
and it remains part of the internal culture of police departments, in which
knowing and adhering to Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment law is part of
what it means to be a police officer. The rule therefore encourages departments
to foster compliance with constitutional norms.14 Similarly, while criminal
prosecutions of police officers are relatively rare, they are well publicized and
have serious sanctions.15 Therefore, they may deter some officers from
engaging in or lying about violent misconduct.16 Civil suits almost certainly
influence some police chiefs to adopt reform measures.17 Small municipalities,
for example, where even relatively small civil judgments are likely to be well
known and costly, are likely to take steps to avoid or reduce future
judgments.18 Finally, investigations by the U.S. Department of Justice for
Section 14141 violations almost inevitably lead local police departments to
agree to substantial and expensive reform rather than risk a lawsuit.19 In each
case, the federal remedy increases the cost or decreases the benefits of
engaging in misconduct relative to adopting remedial measures and, therefore,
encourages some departments to change.

13. See, e.g., David H. Kaye, Unraveling the Exclusionary Rule: From Leon to Herring to
Robinson—And Back?, 58 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 207, 209 (2011) (on exclusionary rule);
Pamela S. Karlan, The Paradoxical Structure of Constitutional Litigation, 75 FORDHAM L. REV.
1913, 1923 (2007) (on civil suits); John C. Jeffries, Jr. & George A. Rutherglen, Structural
Reform Revisited, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1387, 1420 (2007) (on injunctive relief).
14. See Albert W. Alschuler, Studying the Exclusionary Rule: An Empirical Classic, 75 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1365, 1372–74 (2008) (describing changes to police departments resulting from the
exclusionary rule); SAMUEL WALKER, THE NEW WORLD OF POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY 30 (2005)
(describing the effects on policing of the Warren Court’s key rulings, including the exclusionary
rule).
15. See, e.g., infra note 34.
16. Contra Harmon, supra note 11, at 9 (stating criminal prosecutions are too rare to deter
police misconduct); Samuel Walker, The New Paradigm of Police Accountability: The U.S.
Justice Department “Pattern or Practice” Suits in Context, 22 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 3, 20
(2003) (concluding successful criminal prosecutions do not appear to deter future police
misconduct).
17. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and
Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1788 (1991). It is hard to imagine how else a
cottage industry could exist providing risk management consulting to police departments. See,
e.g., CIRMAT, INC., http://www.sashley.com/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2013) (describing risk
management services); LAAW INTERNATIONAL, INC., http://www.laaw.com/lerm.htm (last
visited Jan. 10, 2013). Contra NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, FAIRNESS AND EFFECTIVENESS IN
POLICING: THE EVIDENCE 279 (Wesley Skogan & Kathleen Frydl eds., 2004) (“[I]t is well
recognized that civil suits offer little deterrence to excessive police force.”).
18. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 17, at 280.
19. See Harmon, supra note 11, at 16.
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Although federal remedies seem to work to some degree, few observers
believe these remedies have solved the problem of police misconduct.20 While
data on police conduct and misconduct is difficult to obtain,21 most participants
in Saint Louis University Public Law Review’s Symposium, and elsewhere,
take for granted the need for additional efforts by police departments to
promote civil rights through departmental reform because civil rights
violations continue to occur. In order to deter more misconduct and facilitate
further reform, legal scholars and advocates have proposed innumerable ways
to make federal remedies more effective. They advocate legal and policy
changes designed to enable federal remedies to be used more efficiently, more
often, or at greater cost to officers and departments.22 Although some of these
proposals might be cost-effective means of making federal remedies somewhat
better at incentivizing departmental reform, efforts to improve federal remedies
will face inevitable limits.
Departments have significant power over officer conduct, and many kinds
of misconduct require departmental participation to prevent. But better
policies, training, ongoing supervision, and disciplinary mechanisms are
expensive for departments to adopt.23 Reducing misconduct much further
probably requires improved accountability in many departments that now do
not find key reforms worth the costs. To alter the reform calculus for a large
number of departments, federal remedies would have to increase the expected
costs of misconduct significantly. Unfortunately for those interested in using
federal remedies to affect reform, this cannot be done.
Federal legal remedies for misconduct largely change the relative costs of
misconduct and reform by raising the expected costs of engaging in civil rights
violations, making lawful policing and the remedial measures necessary to
achieve it comparatively more attractive. In calculating the expected cost of
misconduct, officers and departments with adequate information will consider
both the risk that allowing misconduct will result in imposition of a federal
20. See, e.g., WALKER, supra note 14, at 31–35; NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 17,
at 275–81.
21. See Harmon, supra note 11, at 5.
22. See, e.g., Joanna C. Schwartz, Myths and Mechanics of Deterrence: The Role of
Lawsuits in Law Enforcement Decisionmaking, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1023, 1082–85 (2010)
(recommending polices to make civil rights damages actions a more efficient deterrent); Myriam
E. Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform Litigation: Deputizing Private Citizens in the
Enforcement of Civil Rights, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1384 (2000) (advocating statutory changes to
improve Section 14141); Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the
Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345 (2000).
23. See, e.g., Seattle Police Call DOJ’s Reform Proposals Wildly Unrealistic, SEATTLE
TIMES (May 15, 2012, 7:54 PM), http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2018215185_
doj16m.html (describing significant expenses associated with changing policies, adding training,
improving supervision, and ensuring the implementation of such reforms through outside
monitoring).
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judgment and the cost of that judgment if it is imposed. Thus, to further
increase the expected cost of misconduct, federal remedies must impose costs
on officers and departments either more harshly or more often, or make the
translation of costs into incentives for the relevant actors more effectual.
Although federal remedies can be changed to marginally increase the
incentives to reform, federal remedies will never inspire substantially more
reform than they do now because neither legal nor policy reforms will notably
change the cost of federal remedies, the probability they will be imposed, or
their efficiency at driving reform.
II. THE LIMITED COSTS OF FEDERAL REMEDIES
First, none of the federal remedies can be changed to increase notably its
cost to officers and departments when it is employed. The exclusionary rule,
for example, reduces the expected value of misconduct by depriving officers
and departments of the evidentiary value of illegal searches and seizures.24 As
a deterrent, the rule suffers well-known structural limits: excluding evidence
cannot influence officers or departments uninterested in using illegally
obtained evidence in a criminal prosecution, and it cannot discourage
unconstitutional conduct that is unlikely to produce evidence.25 Nevertheless,
federal courts do not presently use the exclusionary rule to its fullest possible
extent. In the name of reducing the societal costs of the exclusionary rule
without undermining its benefits, the Supreme Court permits courts to admit
illegally obtained evidence in grand jury proceedings, preliminary hearings,
and sentencing hearings, for example; as well as collateral non-criminal
proceedings, such as tax proceedings, deportation hearings, and parole
hearings.26 As a result, even when a court finds that an officer discovered
evidence in violation of the Fourth Amendment and, therefore, that the
evidence must be excluded from the prosecution’s case-in-chief in a criminal
case, illegally obtained evidence may retain value for government actors.
Changes to the federal exclusionary rule that would further minimize the
evidentiary value for officers and departments of illegally obtained evidence
are extremely unlikely in light of recent judicial skepticism about whether the

24. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960) (“The [exclusionary] rule is
calculated to prevent, not to repair. Its purpose is to deter—to compel respect for the
constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way—by removing the incentive to
disregard it.”).
25. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1968).
26. See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050 (1984) (deportation hearings); United
States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 457 (1976) (tax proceedings); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S.
338, 354 (1974) (grand jury proceedings); Penn. Bd. of Probation & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S.
357, 369 (1998) (parole hearings); Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 482 (1958)
(preliminary hearings); United States v. McCrory, 930 F.2d 63, 70 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (sentencing).
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rule is worth the cost of allowing guilty individuals to evade justice.27 Even
assuming, however, that this were not so, and that broadening the scope of the
rule to further decrease the benefits of illegally obtaining evidence would be a
cost-effective means of discouraging misconduct, such a project could only
have a limited effect on the rule’s power to deter. The primary cost of
evidentiary exclusion for a police department or local municipality is fixed—it
can do no more than deprive a government of the value of the excluded
evidence. No change to the exclusionary rule can dramatically increase the
costs of the rule for officers and departments. All adjustments can do is to
reduce somewhat the residual value of illegally obtained evidence. Such
changes to the exclusionary rule may encourage a few additional departments
to adopt remedial measures, but they are unlikely to drive significant national
reform.
In addition to depriving the government of the evidentiary benefit of
misconduct, the exclusionary rule can impose secondary political and
reputational costs on the government actors held responsible for the
misconduct and the evidentiary exclusion that follows, increasing the rule’s
influence on the expected costs of misconduct. Thus, when an illegal search by
the police weakens a newsworthy criminal prosecution, the district attorney,
police chief, and mayor may feel the sting of critical popular sentiment.28
While these political costs are not fixed in the same way as the underlying cost
of the evidentiary exclusion, they are likely to be closely correlated with the
consequences of evidentiary exclusion over time. It is therefore difficult to
imagine that strategies to increase these intangible costs could be used to
expand significantly the impact of the exclusionary rule. Thus, neither legal
changes nor strategic use of the exclusionary rule can be expected to alter
considerably the expected costs of misconduct—and, therefore, the behavior of
departments.

27. See, e.g., Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 695, 704 (2009) (expanding the good faith
exception because it neither appreciably deters constitutional violations, nor outweighs its costs in
the context of isolated negligent police mistakes attenuated from the search); Hudson v.
Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 594 (2006) (refusing to apply the exclusionary rule in part because the
costs outweigh its deterrence value for knock-and-announce violations).
28. See, e.g., Buffy Spencer, Judge Throws Out $2 Million Worth of Drugs, Gun as
Evidence in Case Against Springfield Man, THE REPUBLICAN NEWSROOM (Feb. 3, 2009),
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/2177394/posts?page=60; Judge Upheld Law, Not
Police Interests, in Barkyoumb Case, THE REPUBLICAN (Oct. 6, 2009), http://www.masslive.com/
opinion/index.ssf/2009/10/judge_upheld_law_not_police_in.html (citing with approval statement
by judge that misuse of evidence is “corrupt . . . absolutely corrupt” and suggesting that the
message needed to be heard by the district attorney and police chief); Jesse McKinley, Dozens of
Cases to Be Dropped in San Francisco Police Scandal, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2011, at A16 (noting
that San Francisco District Attorney’s office dropped “dozens of drug and robbery cases” after
revelations that undercover officers allegedly committed perjury and conducted illegal searches).
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Federal criminal prosecutions deter misconduct by imposing costs in the
form of imprisonment, fines, and the stigma of criminal conviction on officers
and supervisors who willfully deprive victims of their constitutional rights.29
Criminal prosecutions are likely better at deterring individual officer
misconduct than encouraging departmental reform. Unlike other federal
remedies, the individuals who commit the misconduct suffer most of the costs
of criminal prosecutions. Moreover, federal civil rights criminal cases target
willful conduct, that is, conduct that intentionally deprives the victim of a
constitutional right.30 As a result, although departments can do much to create
a culture that encourages compliance with the law, the conduct targeted by
criminal prosecutions often occurs in spite of policies or training—and officers
can avoid such intentional acts without costly departmental action.
Already, defendants convicted of violating federal criminal civil rights
statutes face very high penalties. An officer can receive the death penalty for
civil rights violations that kill, life imprisonment for violations involving
aggravated sexual abuse or kidnapping, and up to ten years imprisonment for
using a dangerous weapon or causing bodily injury.31 Even a defendant
convicted of depriving someone of their civil rights without a weapon or
causing injury faces a felony conviction and potential imprisonment.32 While
the United States Sentencing Guidelines do not recommend maximal sentences
in most civil rights cases, the guidelines do authorize significant sentences,33
and those convicted of federal civil rights crimes are frequently sentenced to
substantial terms of imprisonment.34
29. See 18 U.S.C. § 242 (2006).
30. See Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945). See also, e.g., CRIMINAL PATTERN
JURY INSTRUCTION COMM. OF THE U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT, CRIMINAL
PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 2.17 (2011); CRIMINAL PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTION COMM. OF
THE U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT, CRIMINAL PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
§ 2.18.
31. See 18 U.S.C. § 242. Although the statute authorizes death for violations including
kidnapping or an attempt to kidnap, aggravated sexual abuse or an attempt to commit aggravated
sexual abuse or an attempt to kill, constitutional restrictions on the application of the death
penalty limit to life imprisonment the legal sentence for violations that do not result in a death.
See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008) (prohibiting application of the death penalty
to defendant convicted of aggravated rape of a child); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977)
(prohibiting application of the death penalty to defendant convicted of raping an adult woman).
32. See 18 U.S.C. § 242.
33. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2H1.1 (2011) (setting base level for
offenses involving individual rights).
34. See e.g., Lawrence Buser, Memphis Ex-Cop’s Drug-Robbery Convictions, Life-Plus
Sentence Upheld, The Commercial Appeal, COMMERCIAL APPEAL (Oct. 24, 2011, 1:47 PM),
http://www.commercialappeal.com/news/2011/oct/24/memphis-ex-cops-drug-robbery-convic
tions-life-plus/; Laura Maggi & Brendan McCarthy, Two Former NOPD Officers Receive Stiff
Sentences in Henry Glover Case, Times-Picayune, (Mar. 31, 2011, 1:41 PM), http://www.nola.
com/crime/index.ssf/2011/03/two_former_nopd_officers_recei.html; Kristen Gosling, Former
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Raising the costs of federal prosecution to deter more misconduct would
require raising the penalties imposed when an officer is convicted under
federal criminal law. There are few absolute bounds on criminal punishment
beyond human mortality and Eighth Amendment limits on the application of
the death penalty, and, more recently, life without parole.35 To deter more
officers from misconduct, Congress could raise the maximum penalty for all
criminal civil rights violations to life imprisonment or impose new mandatory
minimum sentences of imprisonment for violations. However, even assuming
that such actions would be a cost-effective means of deterring future
constitutional violations, criminal sentences are graduated for a purpose: to
achieve marginal deterrence.36 If maximal penalties were imposed for minor
violations, officers who beat a suspect would be given incentive to kill him or
nearby witnesses to lower the risk of being caught without raising the potential
penalty for the crime. Raising the penalties for minor offenses also risks
imposing punishments on criminal defendants far beyond their just deserts in
the name of deterrence—a result many would find unjust.
This is not to say that criminal prosecutions could or should not be used to
raise the costs of misconduct above present levels. One might argue that some
civil rights criminal violations should be sentenced more harshly than present
law permits in order to serve justice and deter future illegal conduct. A police
officer who plants evidence on an innocent suspect or who—enabled by his
uniform, gun, and arrest power rather than the threat of force—pressures
someone to have sex against her will might reasonably receive more than the
one year imprisonment now authorized. But in light of the already very high
costs of federal criminal conviction, and the difficulties of raising those costs
across the board, changes to federal criminal statutes to address such matters
are unlikely to result in criminal punishments for constitutional violations that
are considerably more serious than present law achieves.
Although much of the deterrent potential of criminal convictions comes
from influencing individual officers, because police chiefs and political actors

Uplands Park Officer Leon Pullen Sentenced to 25 Years, KSDK (Jan. 28, 2011, 2:46 PM),
http://www.ksdk.com/rss/article/241087/3/Former-Uplands-Park-police-officer-sentenced.
35. See, e.g., Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010); Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 407; Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
36. One classic statement of the principle of marginal deterrence comes from Jeremy
Bentham. Of the Proportion Between Punishments and Offences, in COLLECTED WORKS OF
JEREMY BENTHAM: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 168
(J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., 1996). Bentham notes that one purpose of punishment is “to
induce a man to choose always the least mischievous of two offenses; therefore where two
offenses come in competition, the punishment for the greater offense must be sufficient to induce
a man to prefer the less.” Id. For a more contemporary analysis, see Steven Shavell, A Note on
Marginal Deterrence, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 345 (1992) (engaging in an economic analysis
of marginal deterrence with respect to fines).
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can pay reputational and political costs for serious criminal conduct that occurs
under their watch, criminal prosecutions may also encourage departments to
engage in remedial measures to prevent misconduct.37 As in the use of the
exclusionary rule, increasing the costs of criminal prosecutions for those who
govern police departments and municipalities could lead to some reform.
Recently, for example, the Department of Justice has coordinated some
criminal prosecutions with civil investigations into widespread department
misconduct, increasing publicity for the criminal convictions and highlighting
for the public the systemic causes of criminal police conduct.38 This strategic
use of criminal prosecutions may increase the secondary costs of criminal
prosecutions and therefore their power to drive reform. But such increases may
be marginal, since prosecutions by the Department of Justice have long

37. See, e.g., Tina Daunt & Henry Weinstein, Officials Renew Call for Outside Probe of
LAPD, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2000, at A1 (“The Rampart situation—in which officers allegedly
conspired to put innocent people in jail and to cover up unjustified shootings and beatings—
warrants a U.S. criminal civil rights investigation because there is evidence of ‘a widespread
pattern and practice of federal civil rights violations’ by Rampart officers, said lawyer Merrick J.
Bobb, an expert on police misconduct who advises the Board of Supervisors and the Los Angeles
Police Commission.”); John Discepelo, Report on Officer-Involved Shootings Says SPD Culture
Must Change, KOMO NEWS (Dec. 22, 2011, 6:23 AM), http://www.komonews.com/news/local/
New-report—136052748.html (noting a Citizens Report on police shootings in Seattle “says the
culture within the police department has to change, specifically in how officers communicate with
the public”); Gabriel Baird & Henry J. Gomez, Police Get Renewed Scrutiny from Feds:
Questions Raised in Other Cities Mirror Issues Here, The PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland, OH), June
26, 2011, at A1 (suggesting that investigations into police brutality by a handful of officers could
lead to investigation of department-wide problems).
38. See Assistant Attorney General Thomas E. Perez Speaks at the East Haven Police
Department Indictment Announcement, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Jan. 24, 2012), http://www.jus
tice.gov/crt/opa/pr/speeches/2012/crt-speech-120124.html (announcing criminal indictment of
East Haven officers and noting that “[c]riminal prosecutions are not the only tool we have to
combat police misconduct . . . [and] the Civil Rights Division [recently] completed a civil
investigation of the East Haven Police Department using our authority under federal civil rights
laws to investigate patterns or practices of police misconduct”); Assistant Attorney General
Thomas E. Perez of the Civil Rights Division Speaks at the Portland, Oregon, Police Bureau
Press Conference, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (June 8, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/crt/opa/pr/
speeches/2011/crt-speech-110608.html (linking criminal investigation of police shooting and civil
pattern or practice investigation of the Portland Police Bureau); Assistant Attorney General
Thomas E. Perez Speaks at the Miami Police Department Investigation Announcement, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Nov. 17, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/crt/opa/pr/speeches/2011/crt-speech111117.html (making public pattern or practice investigation and noting that “most” of the
matters related to the civil investigation were “being evaluated separately with regard to potential
criminal liability by the state or by the Justice Department”). See also Oversight Hearing on the
U.S. Dep’t of Justice Civil Rights Div. Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 31 (2011) (statement of Thomas E. Perez, Assistant Att’y Gen.,
Civil Rights Div.) (“Following the spate of criminal cases involving NOPD officers, the Division
launched a civil pattern or practice investigation of the New Orleans Police Department.”).
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received significant media attention.39 Existing potential reform efforts likely
already reflect much of the potential secondary costs of criminal prosecutions.
One might respond that, more than the exclusionary rule, criminal
convictions have complex and difficult to discern effects on the incentives of
departmental actors who lead reform. While criminal convictions can lead to
reputational costs that encourage remedial measures, federal criminal
convictions of officers in a department also may sometimes lower the costs of
misconduct for police chiefs and politicians by attributing bad acts to
individuals and implicitly relieving departmental leadership of blame.40 If the
Department of Justice’s recent efforts to connect criminal prosecutions and
departmental deficiencies inhibit that phenomenon, they could raise the
secondary costs of criminal convictions for department and municipal leaders.
But even so, it seems unlikely that the Department of Justice’s efforts can
markedly change the expected value of reform for troubled departments
because criminal sanctions inherently emphasize individual responsibility. As a
result, neither the primary costs of criminal convictions on individual
defendants nor the secondary effects of those convictions on others is likely to
alter significantly the calculus governing institutional reform in American
police departments.
Section 14141 permits the Department of Justice to sue police departments
for injunctive relief to stop patterns and practices of constitutional violations
by police officers.41 Although Section 14141 enforcement compels
departments to adopt remedial measures to prevent further misconduct, the
statute is expensive for the Department of Justice to employ. There are more
than fifteen thousand local police departments and sheriff’s offices in the
United States.42 Assuming even a small minority of them is engaged in a
pattern or practice of constitutional violations, the Department of Justice
cannot achieve national reform by suing every department with a pattern of
widespread constitutional violations.43 Nevertheless, as I have argued
elsewhere, because Section 14141 investigations and suits are costly to police
departments as well as the Department of Justice, the threat of a Section 14141
investigation and subsequent suit could—like the threat of other federal
remedies—raise the expected costs of misconduct and induce proactive reform

39. See e.g., Daunt & Weinstein, supra note 37; Robert Reinhold, Verdict in Los Angeles;
Calm Relief Where Rage Once Ruled, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 1993, at A1; John M. Crewdson, ExOfficer Indicted in Miami Racial Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 1980, at A14.
40. See Harmon, supra note 11, at 9; Armacost, supra note 3, at 457–58.
41. 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (2006).
42. See BRIAN A. REAVES, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
CENSUS OF STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES, 2008, at 2 (2011), available at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/csllea08.pdf.
43. Harmon, supra note 11, at 21–22.
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in police departments that are not investigated, in addition to those departments
that are investigated.44
Just as expanding the deterrence effect of other federal remedies requires
increasing their expected costs for departments, exploiting the deterrence
potential of Section 14141 requires increasing the expected costs of permitting
a pattern or practice of constitutional violations for police departments.
However, this goal cannot be achieved by raising the costs of Section 14141
for each department that is investigated or sued since the statute authorizes
only remedial measures and monitoring necessary to eliminate the illegality—
not damages or other non-remedial punishments. As a result, Section 14141
cannot incentivize additional police departments by raising the costs of each
investigation or suit under the statute.45 If Department of Justice suits for
equitable relief are to deter misconduct more than they do now, they must do
so by some other mechanism.
Civil suits for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 do not face the inherent
constraints of other federal remedies. Assuming that the political obstacles to
changing Section 1983 could be overcome, Section 1983 could be used to
impose significantly higher financial awards against officers and departments
than it does now, through expanded punitive damages, for example.46 Despite
this difference, it is highly unlikely that Section 1983 can be used to induce
significant additional institutional reform by raising the costs of misconduct for
departments. Instead, the example of civil damages reveals another obstacle to
using remedial costs to deter more misconduct: federal remedies do not
incentivize reform efficiently. Raising the cost imposed in a civil judgment

44. See id. at 22. In an earlier article, Promoting Civil Rights Through Proactive Policing
Reform, id., I contended that Section 14141 could not induce reform as it is currently enforced,
even if resources devoted to enforcement increase dramatically. Instead, I argued that by
concentrating Section 14141 investigations and suits on police departments with the worst indicia
of misconduct and granting safe harbor for departments that adopt reform measures, Section
14141 could be used to reduce misconduct cost-effectively. This Article contends that both the
limits of Section 14141 in raising the costs of misconduct and some of the alternatives I proposed
earlier apply not only to Section 14141—but to all federal remedies.
45. See id. at 24–25.
46. For example, although the Supreme Court has held that a municipality is immune from
punitive damages under Section 1983 in City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247,
271 (1981), some have questioned the Court’s reasoning that punitive damages would not serve
the purposes of Section 1983 and public policy. See, e.g., Ciraolo v. City of New York, 216 F.3d
236, 243 (2d Cir. 2000) (Calabresi, J., concurring). Such an argument could—at least in theory—
provide a basis for the Supreme Court to reevaluate the breadth of that immunity, something that
existing Supreme Court doctrine might make possible. See Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. at 267 n.
29 (suggesting that imposing punitive damages on taxpayers might not be unjust or unreasonable
in “an extreme situation where the taxpayers are directly responsible for perpetrating an
outrageous abuse of constitutional rights”).
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often will not raise a department’s incentive to adopt remedial policies by the
same measure.
I argue above that criminal prosecutions provide only limited incentives to
departments to reform because many of their costs accrue to individuals and
many of the means of avoiding those costs are within individual control.47 This
point illustrates an important form of remedial inefficiency: the costs imposed
for misconduct do not accrue to the actors who most control institutional
reform. A different version of this problem exists for civil damages actions.
In civil rights actions, governments bear most of the costs of legal
judgments. Because localities often indemnify police officers for civil damage
awards by contract or statute, municipalities ultimately pay civil awards or buy
insurance to pay for them.48 However, the costs borne by municipalities do not
translate easily into political and financial costs for police chiefs and the
political actors that shape their incentives and budgets, and those actors may
face countervailing incentives to permit misconduct or to avoid adopting
remedial measures.49 Many cities fail even to collect information about how
much money is paid in civil judgments against police officers and about what
practices trigger those judgments, making it much more difficult to implement
measures tailored to reduce civil awards.50 Because police departments and
their leaders are not easily forced to internalize the costs borne by the
government, it is not surprising that many departments fail to adopt
institutional reforms even after successful civil judgments impose significant
costs for misconduct.51 Increasing civil penalties for misconduct, even
substantially, may not increase costs on those who must be incentivized to
adopt reforms commensurately, and therefore may not deter substantially more
misconduct than existing civil judgments do.52 While some have advocated
methods for increasing how efficiently civil judgments drive reform,53 the

47. See supra text accompanying notes 29–30.
48. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 17, at 279.
49. See Harmon, supra note 4, at 796 (arguing that government actors face countervailing
pressures not to adopt many reform measures); PETER SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT: CITIZEN
REMEDIES FOR OFFICIAL WRONGS 125 (1983) (suggesting that “countervailing pressures”
including the political environment and bureaucratic needs such as maintaining morale can
compel officials to “tolerate low-level misconduct”).
50. See Schwartz, supra note 22, at 1028 (drawing on documentary evidence and interviews
to argue that most police departments “with more than one thousand sworn officers have no
computerized system to track [civil] lawsuits brought against them”); see id. at 1030, 1040.
51. See Levinson, supra note 22, at 367 (arguing that because government agencies do not
internalize costs, “awarding compensation to the victims of constitutional violations would not
seem to have any deterrent effect on government”).
52. See Schwartz, supra note 22, at 1030, 1081.
53. See, e.g., Richard Emery & Ilann Margalit Maazel, Why Civil Rights Lawsuits Do Not
Deter Police Misconduct: The Conundrum of Indemnification and a Proposed Solution, 28
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 587, 597 (2000) (suggesting that civil suits can change police behavior if
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problem is structural rather than situational. Without significant and
improbable changes in law or public policy, it is unlikely that civil suits can
cost-effectively increase the costs of misconduct significantly enough to
encourage much additional institutional reform.54
III. THE LIMITED FREQUENCY OF FEDERAL REMEDIES
Federal remedies could still be used to change officer conduct on a large
scale if departments and officers could be made to face significantly increased
probability that they would bear the costs of acts of misconduct. However,
federal remedies not only cannot be made to impose considerably higher costs
for each act of misconduct they target, they also cannot practically be imposed
dramatically more often than they are now.
If evidence were excluded from criminal cases in a higher proportion of
illegal searches, some further unconstitutional acts could be discouraged. But
reaching that end is highly improbable, because for decades the Supreme Court
has moved in precisely the opposite direction. The burgeoning good-faith
exception, for example, restricts application of the exclusionary rule when
police officers act in objectively reasonable reliance on a warrant, statute, court
decision, or clerical determination later found to be invalid, unconstitutional, or
mistaken.55 As a result, the Court has expanded over time the number of
unconstitutional acts for which evidence may be admitted at a subsequent
“[a]fter the jury’s verdict as to liability and damages, the judge presiding over the civil rights
case . . . determine[s] what portion of the judgment the city must indemnify” with the officer,
depending on the gravity of the constitutional violations, liable for the rest); Jonathan Papik,
Don’t Knock Them Until We Try Them: Civil Suits as a Remedy for Knock-and-Announce
Violations After Hudson v. Michigan, 30 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 417, 425 (2006) (suggesting
that police misconduct should be deterred by punitive damages in addition to compensatory
damages in civil suits); SCHUCK, supra note 49, at 82, 103 (suggesting that the burden of liability
be shifted from individual officers to the government in order to “strengthen general deterrence
by focusing at a better location the incentives” for compliance with rules by street-level officials).
54. For example, Joanna C. Schwartz has suggested that in contrast to the “dramatic
suggestions offered by [other] scholars,” civil lawsuits can be made a substantially more effective
deterrent by “comparatively small steps,” including new departmental efforts to gather and
analyze information from lawsuits. Schwartz, supra note 22, at 1030. By her own account,
however, most of the departments in her study, which had adopted information gathering policies
and programs had done so involuntarily. See id. at 1057. To accomplish information gathering,
she proposes new federal legislation—a substantial suggestion by any measure; extremely
laborious work by private citizens collecting and publicizing information; or local political
changes, which, if there were sufficient incentive to motivate, likely would have occurred in
additional jurisdictions without court order or Department of Justice suit. See id. at 1082–83. As
this example suggests, even proposals intended to improve civil suits at modest cost face notable
obstacles.
55. See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011) (binding appellate precedent);
Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009) (clerical determination); Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S.
340 (1987) (statute); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (warrant).
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criminal trial. The independent source and inevitable discovery doctrines
similarly restrict the frequency with which exclusion is applied.56 In total, the
exclusionary rule applies to far fewer acts of misconduct than it once did, and
the Supreme Court’s reasoning indicates that this trend will continue, if not
strengthen.
Federal criminal prosecutions for civil rights violations have increased
under the Obama Administration.57 Mark Kappelhoff, the Chief of the Civil
Rights Division, Criminal Section, noted in Saint Louis University Public Law
Review’s Symposium that the Justice Department prosecuted a record number
of police officers in 2010. Nevertheless, by his account, and by every other,
federal criminal cases against police officers remain resource intensive, legally
challenging, and factually difficult to prove.58 As a result, the Department of
Justice prosecutes fewer than one hundred officers.59 To strengthen the
deterrent effect of criminal prosecutions on the 644,000 sworn officers in local
police departments and sheriff’s offices in the United States,60 that number
would have to increase by orders of magnitude. Even without the evidentiary
and legal obstacles such cases face, no realistic budgetary forecast could lead
to that outcome.61 Criminal prosecutions may deter some misconduct now, and
they remain important to promoting justice in individual cases and to
demonstrating federal commitment to civil rights, but they cannot be used to
change the future conduct of many police officers.
Suits by the Department of Justice for injunctive relief are even more
costly and difficult and, therefore, even less common. The Department of
Justice’s efforts in Maricopa County, Arizona illustrate the problem. The
Department launched an investigation into discriminatory policing practices by

56. See, e.g., Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006) (expanding causation requirement
for exclusionary rule); Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533 (1988) (expanding independent
source doctrine); Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984) (recognizing broad inevitable discovery
rule).
57. Peter J. Boyer & Peter Schweizer, Why Can’t Obama Bring Wall Street to Justice?,
NEWSWEEK, May 14, 2012, at 28.
58. See Armacost, supra note 3, at 465–7l; Mary M. Cheh, Are Lawsuits the Answer to
Police Brutality?, in POLICE VIOLENCE: UNDERSTANDING AND CONTROLLING POLICE ABUSE OF
FORCE 254–56 (William A. Geller & Hans Toch eds., 1996).
59. In 2011, for example, only forty-five law enforcement officers, including police officers,
deputy sheriffs and state prison correctional officials, were charged by the Division. See CIVIL
RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FISCAL YEAR 2013 PERFORMANCE BUDGET:
CONGRESSIONAL SUBMISSION 19 (2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/jmd/2013justifica
tion/pdf/fy13-crt-justification.pdf [hereinafter PERFORMANCE BUDGET].
60. See REAVES, supra note 42, at 2.
61. See PERFORMANCE BUDGET, supra note 59, at 5 (“The current Department-wide partial
hiring freeze has impeded [the Civil Rights Division’s] ability to fill position vacancies and
caused delays for securing exceptions.”).
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the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office in 2008.62 Such investigations include a
far-reaching inventory of departmental policies and procedures and interviews
with departmental employees.63 The Maricopa County investigation stalled in
2009 because the Sheriff’s Office refused to give the Department of Justice
access to records necessary for the investigation.64 The Department of Justice
sued for that access in 2010,65 and a negotiated resolution to that suit made the
records available to Department of Justice lawyers, permitting the Department
to continue investigating the office’s practices.66 Pursuant to that investigation,
the Department of Justice’s Civil Rights Division issued a notice of findings in
2011, which alleged widespread discrimination by the sheriff’s deputies.67
Sheriff Arpaio promised cooperation with the Department of Justice, and in
2012 the parties started negotiating towards a set of reform measures intended
to end the pattern of constitutional violations.68 However, those negotiations
broke down when Sheriff Arpaio publicly refused a key point of the settlement
proposed by the Department of Justice, a court-appointed monitor to ensure
compliance with the agreement.69 The Department of Justice filed suit in
spring 2012.70 The complaint begins what is likely to be a long and expensive
trial to prove the Department’s allegations against the Sheriff’s Office, and if
the Department establishes a violation, additional proceedings or negotiations

62. Letter from Thomas E. Perez, Assistant Att’y Gen., to Bill Montgomery, Cnty. Att’y,
Maricopa Cnty. 1–2 (Dec. 15, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/docu
ments/mcso_findletter_12-15-11.pdf [hereinafter Perez Letter].
63. Harmon, supra note 11, at 15.
64. Perez Letter, supra note 62, at 1, n.1 (explaining that the “investigation was delayed
when MCSO repeatedly refused to provide the United States with access to pertinent material and
personnel”); see also J.J. Hensley, Arpaio Won’t Cooperate with Federal Inquiry,
AZCENTRAL.COM (July 8, 2009, 12:00 AM), http://www.azcentral.com/news/articles/2009/07/08/
20090708mcsovdoj0708.html.
65. See generally Complaint, United States v. Maricopa County, No. 2:10-cv-01878-LOA
(D. Ariz. Sept. 2, 2010); see also Marc Lacey, Justice Department Sues Sheriff Over Bias
Investigation, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 2010, at A11; see also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
Justice Department Files Lawsuit Against Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office For Refusing Full
Cooperation With Title VI Investigation (Sept. 2, 2010) (on file with author).
66. See Perez Letter, supra note 62, at 1, n.1 (“The United States and MCSO eventually
resolved this lawsuit in June 2011 after MCSO agreed to provide [the United States] with the
information and access [it] had been seeking.”).
67. See Perez Letter, supra note 62, at 2.
68. See Jason Ryan, DOJ Breaks off Negotiations with Defiant Sheriff Joe Arpaio, ABC
NEWS: LEGAL, (Apr. 3, 2012, 7:24 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2012/04/dojbreaks-off-negotiations-with-defiant-sheriff-joe-arpaio/.
69. Associated Press, Arizona: Sheriff Is Accused of Bad-Faith Negotiations, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 4, 2012, at A14.
70. See Complaint, United States v. Maricopa County, No. 2:12-cv-00981-LOA (D. Ariz.
May 10, 2012); see also Fernando Santos & Charlie Savage, Lawsuit Says Sheriff Discriminated
Against Latinos, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2012, at A18.
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will be needed to specify reforms. The mandated reforms must then be
implemented, and if experience provides a guide, that process could lead to
years of continued litigation contesting compliance.71
Given how difficult and complicated structural reform is, it is perhaps not
surprising that no more than a few dozen police departments have been
investigated in the nearly twenty years since the statute was passed.72 If federal
efforts to enforce Section 14141 were doubled, trebled, or quadrupled, the
Department of Justice could still likely investigate or sue no more than one or
two dozen departments each year, a tiny fraction of the more than fifteen
thousand local police departments and sheriff’s offices in the United States,
many more of which are likely engaged in a pattern of unconstitutional
action.73 Worse yet, federal efforts may well be Sisyphean; even as the
Department of Justice investigates new departments for violating civil rights,
some departments it previously investigated need revisiting.74 Thus, while
Section 14141 remains an important tool for reforming problematic
departments, without dramatic revisions to the ways in which it is enforced, it
is unlikely that it can be imposed with sufficient frequency to change the
calculus of reform for many police departments engaged in misconduct.75
Civil suits under Section 1983 do not depend on government resources. As
a result, they do not face the same limitations as criminal prosecutions or suits
under Section 14141. But that also means that civil suits cannot be made more
frequent by devoting more federal resources to them. Some factors routinely
cited as limiting the frequency of civil suits presently—legal doctrines
71. See, e.g., Patrick McGreevy, Extension Sought for Police Decree, L.A. TIMES, May 11,
2006, at B3 (describing dispute over extending consent decree beyond its initial five year term);
see also Lift the LAPD Consent Decree, L.A. TIMES (May 24, 2009), http://articles.latimes.com/
2009/may/24/opinion/ed-consent24 (explaining that initially, the department moved slowly to
embrace the consent decree, and completing its requirements took longer than expected); Joel
Rubin, U.S. Judge Ends Federal Oversight of the LAPD, L.A. TIMES (July 18, 2009), http://arti
cles.latimes.com/2009/jul/18/local/me-consent-decree18 (reporting that the consent decree under
which LAPD had been operating for eight years had finally been lifted, but that there were still
outstanding issues including racial profiling and financial disclosures).
72. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., Special Litigation Section Cases and
Matters, http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/findsettle.php#policehttp://www.justice.gov/crt/
about/spl/findsettle.php#police (last visited Jan. 10, 2013) (providing a list of law enforcement
agencies the DOJ has investigated).
73. See Harmon, supra note 11, at 4.
74. See, e.g., CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE NEW
ORLEANS POLICE DEPARTMENT (2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/nopd_
report.pdf. For instance, a DOJ pattern or practice investigation of the New Orleans Police
Department more than a decade ago noted that “some NOPD officers could not articulate proper
legal standards for stops, searches, or arrests,” and the 2011 DOJ pattern or practice investigation
noted that “NOPD still does not provide meaningful in-service training to officers on how to
properly carry out stops, searches, and arrests.” Id.
75. See Harmon, supra note 11, at 22–23.
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governing qualified immunity and municipal liability, practical difficulties in
obtaining legal representation, and the obstacles to proving misconduct by law
enforcement officers76—are unlikely to change.
However, one trend may notably increase the frequency of civil suits and
perhaps also criminal prosecutions: the spread of new technologies that
increase the ability of plaintiffs and prosecutors to prove misconduct. In the
last few years, privately-held video-recording devices, often in the form of
cellular telephones, have become ubiquitous. At the same time, police
departments have installed cameras in police cars, and as new devices become
available and affordable, have provided officers with wearable video-recording
devices.77 This dramatic increase in videotaping of police conduct, both by
citizens and police departments themselves, enables prosecutors and plaintiffs
to establish liability for some incidents that lack independent or credible
witnesses. Because it facilitates cases that would otherwise be extremely
difficult to bring, the additional videotaping is likely to deter some additional
misconduct. Nevertheless, while videotape mitigates problems of proof, it does
not eliminate them, and it does not mitigate the other obstacles to suit in
criminal or civil cases.78
As this discussion suggests, outside this small island of promise, none of
the major remedies for police misconduct is likely to increase notably in the
costs it imposes for acts of misconduct, in the frequency with which it is
applied, or in the efficiency with which expected costs for misconduct translate
into reform. Expanding resources and reforming federal remedies may achieve
marginal improvements, but the structural, doctrinal, and practical obstacles to
increasing the deterrent effect of the federal exclusionary rule, criminal civil
rights prosecutions, civil suits, and suits for equitable relief are notable and
likely persistent. As a result, while these remedies may be used to influence
some additional departments to adopt promising remedial measures, they are
unlikely to drive significant national reform.

76. See Aramcost, supra note 3, at 467–71.
77. See TASER Ships Axon Flex On-Body Cameras, POLICE (May 24, 2012), http://www.po
licemag.com/Channel/Technology/News/2012/05/24/TASER-Ships-Axon-Flex-On-Body-Camer
as.aspx?ref=OnTarget-Thursday-20120524&utm_source=Email&utm_medium=Enewsletter
(noting that the new second-generation digital video recorder camera weighs only fifteen grams,
can be mounted on a collar, cap, helmet, or eyeglasses, and is being adopted immediately by
several major police departments).
78. Part II argues that raising monetary damages under Section 1983 might not produce
commensurate reform because police chiefs will not internalize most of those additional costs.
See supra notes 46–52 and accompanying text. The same problem extends to raising the expected
costs of civil suits by increasing the frequency of suits. The resulting expected costs for
municipalities are similarly difficult to translate into costs for the actors who could most easily
prevent future violations.
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Furthermore, even if many of these obstacles could be overcome, and
federal remedies could be used to impose substantial additional costs on police
departments that engage in unconstitutional conduct, federal efforts would still
fail to produce the kind of officer conduct many advocates seek. All of these
major federal remedies suffer the same well-known defect for those interested
in shaping police conduct: they exclusively target constitutional violations.
While constitutional law prohibits many kinds of serious misconduct, many
avoidable, but necessary-in-the-moment uses of force; retaliatory arrests for
trivial offenses; and lies told by police officers to citizens and courts do not
violate the Constitution; and, therefore, cannot be deterred by federal remedies.
At best, discouraging constitutional violations using federal remedies will
secondarily improve police conduct more generally by improving
accountability and increasing professionalism. The exclusionary rule seems to
have had that effect.79 But depending on constitutional remedies to fix nonconstitutional misconduct seems a crooked path to important goals for
American policing.
IV. THE LIMITS OF OTHER MEANS OF RAISING THE COSTS OF MISCONDUCT
Federal remedies remain significant in spite of these limits. They already
incentivize some reform, they have purposes other than deterrence, and they
can be improved somewhat to deter misconduct further. Nevertheless, those
interested in broader reform must look further.
To some degree, looking further means exploring underutilized or new
federal means of increasing the costs of misconduct for departments. For
example, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 196480 and the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 196881 prohibit law enforcement agencies
receiving federal funds, training, or technical assistance from discriminating on
the basis of race, color, national origin, sex, or religion. Since police
departments receive substantial federal assistance,82 these statutes could be
used to induce remedial measures designed to prevent discrimination of
individuals by police officers. One could also imagine new analogous statutes
that condition federal funds for police departments on abstaining from forms of
misconduct other than discrimination.
Presently, Title VI is not used to its full deterrent potential. Existing
federal regulations limit the statute’s use to induce reform because they specify

79.
80.
81.
82.

See Walker, supra note 14, at 29–31.
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d–2000d7 (2006).
42 U.S.C. § 3789d (2006).
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FISCAL YEAR 2013 PERFORMANCE BUDGET: OFFICE OF
JUSTICE PROGRAMS 8 (2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/jmd/2013justification/pdf/fy
13-ojp-justification.pdf (indicating that federal grants to state and local law enforcement total
more than one billion dollars).
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that the Department of Justice should enforce Title VI only to “secure prompt
and full compliance so that needed [f]ederal assistance may commence or
continue” and dictate enforcement strategies designed to minimize the statute’s
impact on funding.83 As a result, while Title VI is sometimes used in
conjunction with Section 14141, it is rarely used with notable effect against
police departments.84 Even if there were no regulations that restricted its
enforcement, Title VI, and any new federal remedies based on it, would likely
suffer from some of the same obstacles that presently limit the frequency of
Section 14141 suits: discrimination in violation of federal law is expensive to
investigate and difficult to prove.
V. EXPLORING AN ALTERNATIVE MECHANISM OF REFORM: CHANGING THE
EXPECTED COSTS AND BENEFITS OF REFORM
The federal government likely plays an ineliminable role in regulating the
police. State and local actors face strong majoritarian interests in crime control
and powerful special interests in law enforcement that may inhibit reaching a
good balance between police effectiveness and civil rights.85 Perhaps for this
reason, state and local legal remedies for police misconduct have long been
weaker than their federal counterparts. But federal remedies are close to the
practical limits of their ability to raise the expected costs of misconduct for
police departments. For this reason, it is worth considering whether federal
efforts should target the other side of the equation for police departments: the
costs and benefits of the remedial measures likely to reduce misconduct. While
existing remedies induce reform by making misconduct costly, federal
resources can also be used to lower the costs and increase the benefits of
institutional reform. Rather than continue to look for ways to make misconduct
unappealing relative to reform, it may be time to consider ways to make reform
more appealing relative to misconduct.
As I have pointed out elsewhere, the Department of Justice already
facilitates reform by lowering its information costs.86 For example, the
Department has funded reports intended to show police leadership how to

83. See 28 C.F.R. § 50.3(a) (2011) (Guidelines for the enforcement of Title VI, Civil Rights
Act of 1964).
84. For an example of a recent use of Title VI in conjunction with Section 14141, see Press
Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice: Office of Pub. Affairs, Department of Justice Files Lawsuit in
Arizona Against Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office, and Sheriff Joseph Arpaio (May 10, 2012),
available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/May/12-crt-602.html.
85. See Harmon, supra note 4, at 811–16.
86. See Harmon, supra note 11, at 48–49, 56–57; see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE: OFFICE
OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, Mission and Vision, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/about/mission.htm (last
visited Jan. 10, 2013) (stating that OJP seeks to “provid[e] and coordinat[e] information, research
and development, statistics, training, and support to help the justice community build the capacity
it needs to meet its public safety goals”).
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adopt computerized early intervention systems and how to conduct internal
affairs investigations in small departments.87 But those efforts have been
limited.88 The Department of Justice could work more aggressively and
strategically to promote research on the causes of misconduct and the
effectiveness of reforms, disseminate information and model policies on
promising reforms, and provide technical assistance to departments seeking to
adopt them. In this way, the Department of Justice could further lower the
information barriers to reform.
Although some gains may be available by increasing research, training,
and technical assistance by the Department of Justice, the information costs of
policing reform are relatively small and bounded. Departments considering
adopting and maintaining remedial measures as a means to lower the costs of
misconduct likely face much greater infrastructure, personnel, and training
costs than information costs. The Department of Justice already subsidizes
reform, for example, by providing grants to local departments to encourage
specific remedial measures. Thus, the Office of Community Oriented Policing
Services has given tens of millions of dollars in grants to state and local police
agencies for the purchase of in-car video cameras that can be used to improve
training and accountability for officers.89 But, overwhelmingly, the Department
of Justice’s grants to police departments serve purposes other than promoting
civil rights.90 One could imagine a much stronger federal grant program
designed to subsidize cost-effective remedial measures for preventing key
forms of misconduct.
I have also argued elsewhere that the Department of Justice could increase
the benefits of reform for police departments by, for example, introducing a

87. See, e.g., BEAU THURNAUER, INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, Best PRACTICES
GUIDE FOR INTERNAL AFFAIRS: A STRATEGY FOR SMALLER DEPARTMENTS 6 (2008), available
at http://www.theiacp.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=4B%2f4SDZtgV8%3d&tabid=392; SAMUEL
WALKER, OFFICE OF CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERV., EARLY INTERVENTION SYSTEMS FOR
LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES: A PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT GUIDE (2003); SAMUEL
WALKER, THE NEW WORLD OF POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY 107 (2005); INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS
OF POLICE, THE IMPACT OF VIDEO EVIDENCE ON MODERN POLICING 25 (2003), available at
www.cops.usdoj.gov/Publications/video_evidence.pdf [hereinafter IMPACT OF VIDEO EVIDENCE]
(observing that in-car camera recordings “may serve as an early warning of an officer
experiencing problems that should be addressed”).
88. See Harmon, supra note 11, at 56–57.
89. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMMUNITY ORIENTED POLICING SERVICE GRANT
PROGRAMS FISCAL YEAR 1994-2009, 1 (2012), available at http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/
grants_glossary.pdf [hereinafter COPS GRANT PROGRAMS] (“In-Car Camera Program: Provided
vehicle-based video camera systems to state law enforcement agencies to deter assaults on
officers, provide evidence in trials and increase law enforcement accountability. (2000-2003)”);
IMPACT OF VIDEO EVIDENCE, supra note 87, at 1 (COPS “provided over $21,000,000 in grants to
help state police and highway patrol agencies purchase over 5,000 cameras”).
90. See COPS GRANT PROGRAMS, supra note 89.
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safe harbor from suit under Section 14141 for police departments that commit
themselves to adopt a preset array of reform measures specified by the
Department of Justice and make verifiable progress toward their
implementation.91 Such a program would require a significant change in the
Department of Justice’s Section 14141 enforcement program and an effective
monitoring scheme. But by providing immediate rewards for departments that
adopt such reforms, it could also open a significant new avenue for changing
the calculus of misconduct and reform for police departments, something
existing federal remedies cannot offer.92
Federal resources could also be used to increase the reputational and
professional benefits for chiefs who adopt reform efforts. Accreditation
provides reputational benefits to departments and chiefs that satisfy specific
administrative and operational standards, and it could be a mechanism for
further identifying and rewarding reform efforts.93 The Department of Justice
could also increase professional benefits for civil rights initiatives informally,
by holding prestigious invitation-only conferences for police chiefs with
reputations as reformers. Since the possibilities of inducing reform by reducing
its costs and increasing its benefits have not been adequately explored, there
may be many other creative and cost-effective means of encouraging chiefs
and municipalities to adopt reforms. These suggestions are merely the
beginning.
This approach to reducing police misconduct is not without risk. In order
to lower the cost of reform or raise its benefits, the federal government must be
able to evaluate police department efforts. Those efforts can be measured
either by their impact on misconduct outcomes or by departmental progress in
implementing specific reforms. Unfortunately, both means of evaluating
departmental efforts are problematic. Presently, there exist only crude outcome
measures for misconduct, and little data to support them.94 Without better
measures, it would be hard to compare the success of police department reform
efforts. If instead the Department of Justice rewards implementing particular
remedial measures without reference to outcomes, the cost-effectiveness of
federal efforts to incentivize reform will depend heavily on the Department’s
success in endorsing cost-effective remedial measures. If the Department of
Justice chooses ineffectual reforms, the federal government and municipalities
91. See Harmon, supra note 11, at 36–42.
92. See id. at 37–38.
93. Accreditation offers the greatest incentive to departments nearest to meeting the
credentialing standards set out by the accreditation agency, and therefore incentivizes good
departments to become better rather than encouraging departments most in need of reform to
adopt remedial measures. See Harmon, supra note 11, at 48 n.144. Nevertheless, if the goal is to
promote effective reform nationally, accreditation may provide one cost-effective means to
achieve this end.
94. Id. at 5.
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could spend valuable resources and receive little benefit or even undermine
other law enforcement goals.95 Yet, without additional data, the Department of
Justice will also have difficulty evaluating competing reforms or the distorting
effect such reforms could have on policing more broadly. Thus, collecting
national data is an essential precondition for federal efforts to lower the costs
and increase the rewards of reform as a means to reduce misconduct.96 Even
with such data, there are no guarantees that federal monies used to induce
reform will be well spent.
Despite such risks, advocates, scholars, and policymakers should devote
new energy to exploring federal means of lowering the costs and increasing the
benefits of reform. The law, politics, and practicalities that circumscribe
existing federal remedies mean that additional efforts to refine those remedies
are likely to achieve only marginal gains in deterring misconduct. Against this
backdrop, this untapped resource for inducing national reform promises more
hope than danger.

95. See id. at 41.
96. Id.

